ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
elationships between firm resources and performance attract much research interest even though little is known about why some firms use resources successfully and others do not (Helfat 2000) . Extant literature suggests that superior performance comes from resource uniqueness (Barney 1991) , reconfiguration and integration of existing resources (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Teece et al. 1997) , and the ability to respond appropriately to the environment (Mintzberg 1987 , Pfeffer and Salancik 1978 , Tan and Litsschert 1994 . Scholars suggest that strategy and performance depend largely on the accessibility, timing, and amount of financial resources during development and new investments. Financial resources enable or constrain the strategic decisionmaking abilities of entrepreneurs and managers (Gilbert et al. 2006 , Pissarides 1999 , Zou et al. 2010 ). However, many researchers ignore access to different sources of financial capital as a crucial factor that offers competitive advantage. In this study, we analyze the financial capital impact on competitive advantages by focusing on a highly regulated market with large institutional and regional disparity regarding resource access.
Resource theorists suggest that a firm differs from another due to differences in sources of advantage (Peng 2009 ) and strategic orientations (Zhou and Li 2010) . Institutional theorists claim that sources of competitive advantage are discovered due to differences in institution frameworks (DiMaggio and Powell 1999, North 1990 , Oliver 1997 , Peng 2002 , Scott 1995 . Firms have different levels of access to sources of financial capital because of variations in institutional frameworks. The China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) heavily regulates financing activities, so Chinese firms have unequal rights to finance and equity capital and bonds. Firms in other countries such as the US must fully and truthfully disclose information before financing operations. A regulatory developed market, then, to favor some firms and discriminate against others by influencing their access to sources of capital and finance. China's regulatory regime restricts Chinese firms in their ability to obtain funds through the financial markets. Its regulations define which firms can access different sources of financial capital and which firms can achieve both competitive and sustained competitive advantages. In this paper, we explore the relation between access to difference sources of financial capital and competitive advantage that may be created by government-CSRC regulation and other institutional differences. The CSRC regulates the issuance of securities, primarily determining their regulatory requirements by firm-based quantitative and qualitative criteria. Table 1 provides a summary of the historical evolution of the main quantitative criteria (Appendix for a complete listing).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
External analysis of competitive advantage focuses on idiosyncratic firm attributes as they impact competitiveness (Porter 1990 ). Such analysis isolates characteristics, or resources, that exploit opportunities and neutralize threats (Barney 1991 ). External analysis is based on two assumptions concerning idiosyncratic firm resources. First, competitive advantage assumes that firms within an industry control identical strategically relevant resources and pursue the same strategies (Porter 1981 , Rumelt 1984 . Second, industries develop resources heterogenically but for the short-term because the resources are highly mobile (Barney 1986 ). Such analyses assume that firms have the same resources for implementing strategies or have the same access to resources for achieving competitive advantage. In line with this analysis, we argue that regulations and weak institutional environments can also create a competitive advantage for firms that have the same resources but different levels of access to resources, that is, financial capital, for implementing strategies.
The concept of RBV competitive advantage is based on the link between a firm's internal characteristics and performance (Rumelt 1984) . In addition to internal competencies that generate competitive advantages, external factors also affect RBV (Collis and Montgomery, 1995) . Most industries probably possess at least some degree of resource heterogeneity and immobility (Barney and Hoskisson, 1990) . They cannot expect to obtain sustained competitive advantage when all competing firms have evenly distributed strategic resources (Barney 1991) . Across firms in China, access to financial resources is uneven and mobility is imperfect. China's weak financial infrastructure makes it difficult for most Chinese firms to raise capital. (Ju and Zhao 2009, Peng et al. 2010 ).
In addition to firm-and industry-levels characteristics, scholars suggest that firms must consider wider state and social influences when designing and implementing strategies (DiMaggio and Powell 1999, Oliver 1997 , Peng 2002 ). These influences are considered broadly to be the institutional framework (North 1990 , Scott 1995 , a perspective applied to strategic research regarding the IBV of business strategy theory (Peng 2002, Peng and Heath, 1996) . Hence, researchers must study institutional frameworks: how, why, and when they matter (Powell, 1996) .
Institution theory provides strong insight for studies of business in developing countries (Peng, Wang and Jiang 2008, Peng et al. 2009 ) and Asia (Hoskission et al. 2000 ). Asia's emerging economy is not uniform, and its formal institutions fall short of supporting low-transaction-cost business operations in three critical areas: credible legal framework, stable political structure, and functioning strategic market factors (Khanna and Palepu 1997 , Peng 2002 , Peng and Heath 1996 . From business's viewpoint, institutional literature focuses on formal laws, rules, and regulations, (La Porta et al. 2008) . Underdevelopment of formal institutions in emerging economies causes much uncertainty regarding supply and demand conditions and sudden changes in government policies (Hoskission et al. 2000, Wright et al. 2005) . Formal institutions encourage market competition, reduce information issues, and enhance legal effectiveness (Zhou and Peng 2010) . In developed economies, specialized organizations such as stock markets, research firms, law firms, and courts -as a collection of formal institutions -handle costly activities including allocating capital, obtaining information, and enforcing contacts (Peng 2002 ).
We investigate how CSRS's regulation for external financing, institutional developments affect competitive advantage and what sources of financial capital and finance offer competitive advantage in a highly regulated market. The RBV fails to adequately consider context; in one context, valuable, rare, inimitable resources and capabilities are non-valuable; in another they are plentiful and easily imitated ). We study both RBV and IBV and find support for the underlying mechanisms that relate institutions to organizational strategies and link them to performance. We focus on Chinese listed firms that raise external capital from SEOs. They can obtain equity capital through existing shareholders (right offerings) and/or the public (public offerings). In China, firms must meet regulation requirements before an SEO, and they have unequal rights when raising capital through secondary public and rights share offerings. Equity financing represents a luxury available only to a few listed Chinese firms, although the ability to issue shares is a valuable intangible asset (Zou and Xiao 2006) . Young firms possessing rich equity capital during developmental periods enjoy many advantages, perform better, and exploit resources from rich market niches (Lee et al. 2001) . Biomedical firms experiencing a lack of equity capital while pursuing significant technological breakthroughs perform more poorly than firms that have enough equity capital for technological developments (Roberts and Hauptman 1987) . These agreements lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A firm that has better access to equity capital has (a) a higher level of competitive advantage and (b) a higher level of sustained competitive advantage. Vorasubin and Chareonngam (2007) demonstrate that access to debt financing is a vital source of financial capital. They examine unlisted construction firms, but omit access to the bond market, which is outside the scope of their study. Generally, bonds are a low-cost debt-financing option, but development of the Chinese bond market is far behind the stock market (Hirson 2005, Leung and Young 2002) and is the smallest corporate bond market in East Asia (Linton 2006) . Corporate bonds issuance became more liberal after 1999. Still, all firms unable to freely issue bonds because first they must meet CSRC's regulation criteria, and they have unequal debt-financing bond rights. Hence, firms have preferential access to bond finance may obtain adequate investment funds when needed to gain competitive advantage.
Corporate bond can substitute for a bank loan, which reduces over-reliance on bank loans and enables firms to acquire long-term debt capital directly. Although the ability to issue bonds is a valuable intangible financial-asset, Chinese firms possess unequal rights regarding bonds. The bond market has, however, been changing dramatically in the transition from a command to a market economy (Huang and Song 2006 ). An accelerated bond market expands financial channels for listed companies. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A firm that has higher ability to access bond capital has (a) a higher level of competitive advantage and (b) has a higher level of sustained competitive advantage.
A vital source of financial capital is access to bank financing at a competitively lower cost than the primary competitors (Vorasubin and Chareonngam 2007) . Firms with better access to bank financing assume much lower interest rates under better terms. Before the late 1990s, bank financing was a primary financing source for Chinese firms (Ma, 1998) and is still a main source of debt finance because bond financing is inadequate (Fazzari et al. 1988, Leung and Young, 2002) , so competition is high for bank financing with better terms. Firms with better access to bank financing are better able to manage trade credit and are more likely to gain advantage from early-payment discounts and avoid late-payment penalties (Uzzi and Gillapsi 2002). However, Chinese firms over rely on bank loans to meet their financing needs (Linton 2006) . Before recent banking reforms, banks acted as government agents that distributed funds to preapproved projects with little to no collateral and without proper credit analysis. After reform, commercial banks granted loans under commercial terms, including SOEs; local governments and government officials were forbidden to interfere with banks in their lending decisions (Peiser and Wang 2002) . These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: The ability to generate internal funds is an important source of financial capital (Peng 2009 , Wang 2010 . A firm that is better able to raise internal funds enjoys competitive advantage by reducing financing costs and selffinancing highly profitable investments. Debt instruments are difficult to acquire because of problems in forecasting how much capital is needed and how long it will take to realize intangible investment returns (Vorasubin and Chareonngam 2007) . Therefore, most intangible investments must be financed through internal funds such as retained earnings. Firms that face tighter financing constraints must rely more on internal funds (Fazzari and Peterson 1993) . Inland firms rely more on internal funds for investment than coastal firms, and the sensitivity gap between inland and coastal firms widens under contractionary monetary policy (Sun and Yamori 2009). Inland firms find it more difficult to obtain outside funds, such as those from capital markets. Thus capital markets in China reflect regional institution disparities. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis. 
Dependent variables
We used firm-specific, abnormal profitability (F ijt ) to measure competitive advantages. Abnormal profit is the difference between a firm's ROA and its industry-median ROA (Jacobsen, 1988; ). We used CSRC's industry classification and divided the sample into 21 industries using the two-digit code for manufacturing and the one-digit code for nonmanufacturing industries. F ijt is attributed to a firm independent of industry structural characteristics (Acquaah 2003 ).
Persistence of abnormal profitability (Ф ijt ) is used to measure sustained competitive advantage; it is defined as the proportion of a firm's abnormal profitability (F ijt ) that persists systematically in any time before time t (Acquaah 2003 , Mueller 1986 ). We use industry-adjusted return on assets (IROA) to calculate firm-specific abnormal profitability and 3-year-average IROA as persistence of firm-specific abnormal profitability (Acquaah 2003 , Mueller 1986 ).
Independent variables
We measure eligibility to access (ability) to initiate SEO using the approach suggested by Zou and Xiao (2006) . We construct a dummy variable for each firm that satisfies all regulation criteria for SEO (E1), denoted as 1 and 0. Amount obtained from equity (E2) is measured as Millions of Chinese Yuan value of net equity sales in the financial year. 2 We measure ability to issue bonds (B1) as a construct dummy variable based on screening of each firm's regulatory criteria eligibility for issuing bonds, denoted 1 and 0. Amount obtained from bonds (B2) is measured as Millions of Chinese Yuan value of bonds sales in the financial year. 2 Ni et al. (2010) find that banks are more likely to grant loans to Chinese firms that have more tangible assets such as properties that can be mortgaged. The tangibility ratio (TAN) is used to measure a firm's ability to obtain finance from commercial banks (L1; Ni et al. 2010) . It computes as property, plant and equipment, and inventories divided by total assets. Amount obtained from bank loans (L2) is measured in Millions of Chinese Yuan value of bank loan obtained in the financial year (Li et al. 2008 ).
Self-financing firms have advantages over competitors that have lesser self-financing ability; self-financing depends on retained earnings, and the retention rate (RET) can be used as a measure. RET is calculated as 1 minus the dividend pay-out ratio (I1). Amount retained from internally generated funds (I2) is measured in Millions of Chinese Yuan value of retained profit in the financial year.
Control variables
Firm size (SIZE) is measured in terms of the logarithm of total assets, while age (AGE) is measured as the number of years since incorporation. Financial leverage measures as the debt/equity ratio. The market-to-book value ratio (MBV) is also used as a control variable to capture growth prospects. Ownership type (OWN) is measured using a dummy variable; 1 if the largest controlling shareholder is the government, and 0 otherwise (privately owned) (Wu and Pangakar, 2010) . 2 Capital investment may impact on firm performance in short-and long-terms differently. Effective capital investment (CAPI) is measured by the asset turnover ratio (Vorasubin and Chareonngam, 2007 2 Regarding the requirements to access sources of financial capital, one major criterion is previous performance and other capabilities prior to accessing financial capital. We chose the time-lagged return on sales (ROS) because it is a less-biased measure and highly applicable to cross-sectional comparisons between firms with varying levels of assets intensity (Bettis 1981 
RESULTS
In assessing whether a firm meets the requisite regulation criteria, we manually filtered for the established regulations with very few exceptions caused by information limitations. For equity offerings, we excluded two qualitative regulatory requirements that specify that the issuing firm had no harmful related-party transactions with controlling shareholders and no public reprimands for exchanges over the previous year. For assessing eligibility to issue corporate bonds, we excluded one qualitative criterion: that the firm had not delayed payment of principal and interest on bonds or other debt. In determining eligibility to issue convertible bonds, we excluded two qualitative requirements: that the firm had no delayed payment of principal and interest on bonds or other debt, and no guarantees, litigation, arbitration, or other significant matters that seriously affect continuing operations. Table 2 shows the number and the percent of firms that met the eligibility regulation criteria of CSRC for access to right and public offerings of equity and issuance of convertible and non-convertible bonds in each year during the sample period. These data also lend reliability to our selection procedure for ascertaining eligibility since change is very discernible in the number of eligible firms corresponding to the changes in regulations. The data show the dominance of the SOEs in terms of the number of firms eligible to issue securities under the CSRC regulations. Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of control and independent variables. Financial leverage also rose from 53% in 2000 to 59% in 2009, and averaged about 60%. This suggests that average debt as a percent of total assets was about 38%. Market-to-book ratio varied substantially, suggesting volatility in growth prospects. Tangibility, which shows the tangible assets as a proportion of total assets, averaged about 46% and showed a slight increase over time. Thus, the ability of firms to use tangible assets as collateral to obtain bank financing was fairly stable during the sample period. Profitability also varied with an average of just 2%, implying that, on average, Chinese companies have not been very profitable. Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables included in the regressions. The variance inflation factors (VIF) are below 2, which shows that multicollinearity is not a serious concern. Furthermore, we find some preliminary evidence suggesting that all four financing variables show positive associations with competitive and sustained competitive advantages.
We employed hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to separate regional and industry effects from the hypothesized firm effects. HLM provides a better way to examine data with hierarchically nested structures (Hofmann 1997) . Table 5 presents the HLM regression output for the relationships between ability to access various sources of financial capital and competitive and sustained competitive advantages. Table 5 shows that firm size, growth opportunities, and institutional factor index positively affect (p <0.001) competitive and sustained-competitive advantages. Firm ownership type (p <0.1), political connection (p <0.05), leverage (p <0.001), and competitive intensity (p<0.05) negatively influence advantages. Access to all external sources of financial capital: ability to offer equity and issuance of bonds (except ability to access to bank finance) are positively related (p <0.001) to advantages. These results support hypotheses 1a, and 2a. Access to all external sources of financial capital-ability to offer equity, issuance of bonds, and accessibility to bank loan-is related positively (p <0.001) to sustained competitive advantage. As indicated in model 3, the ability to generate internal capital is related positively (p <0.001) to competitive and sustained competitive advantages.
Amount financed by equity and internally generated funds are related positively (p <0.001) to competitive advantage. All external sources of financial capital-amount financed by equity, and bank loan (excluding amount financed by bonds) -are related positively (p <0.001) to sustained competitive advantage. As indicated in model 3 of Table 6 , the amount to generated by internal funds is related positively (p <0.001) to competitive and sustained competitive advantages.
We take steps to alleviate endogeneity problem. We specify lagged models, as suggested by Bromiley (1991) . We use measures from previous year (t-1) as the predictor variables while using industry-adjusted profitability (IROA) to measure competitive advantage. Bromiley (1991) suggested a one-year lag structure that subsequent researchers have followed (Tan 2003 . We used size at the beginning of the year to control economics of scale or size effect (Tan 2003 . We added lag ROS to the models to control for the potential endogeneity and reverse causality (Heckman and Borjas 1980, Wu et. al 2010) .
DISCUSSION
We focus on China for this study and contribute to the RBV and IBV literatures by examining access to sources of financial capital on competitive and sustained competitive advantages, recognizing that China's underdeveloped and highly regulated market means that regions vary in institutional sources of financial capital. We study the influence of regulations and institutional developments that lead firms to seek various sources of financial capital and thus contribute to growing research concerning a little-understand topic: entrepreneurial resource accumulation and exploitation during the transition (Meyer 2001, Meyer and ).
We present evidence that governmental agencies must be aware of the impacts of their policies on the development and competiveness of different types of firms. Firms must have access to financial resources if they are to modernize their operations, so policymakers must continue developing relevant institutions and relaxing regulations to make the market more transparent and reduce transaction costs. Such developments could eradicate existing discrimination conferred by regulations and institutional factors. Peng (2002) This study is significant for several reasons. First, it addresses the literature's failure to consider effects of financial resources on competitive and sustained competitive advantages in a tightly regulated institutional environment. Second, results support strategy scholars in arguing the importance of resources, and, in this instance, the accessibility to sources of financial capital and effects on sustained outcomes (Acquaah 2003 , Barney 1991 The results demonstrate that highly regulated markets significantly discriminate against some firms in their need to access financial capital. Furthermore, the results complement empirical studies on RBV that investigate firm-specific effects under tight regulations and institutional theory indicating that institutional environments inhibit some firms from accessing external financing. Findings suggest that imperfections in policy-driven capital and underdeveloped bond markets, implies uncollateralize external financial capital is less accessible. Those firms are unable to access equity and bond capital due to high information and operational costs. Furthermore, Chinese firms highly depend on bank loans; most interest expenses are not much different among firms in the short-term.
Internally generated capital is also important for exacting competitive advantages. However, internally generated capital yields less than externally financed capital and, as a whole, yields little significant advantage. Our descriptive analysis is found that, on average, Chinese companies have not been very profitable. Internally generated funds are insufficient to finance growth and new investment in most Chinese firms. Ayyagari et al. (2010) and Cull et al. (2009) find that highly profitable private firms can finance growth solely through retained earnings and their findings explain why internally generated capital yields little significant advantage.
We find that large firms have greater access to external financing, but small firms cannot afford to do so. Some researchers argue that formal financing development positively impacts small firms (Beck et al. 2007 , Beck et al. 2005 . Others argue that formal financing development assists only large firms (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990) . Findings support that formal financing development assists large firms, but reforms are inadequate and Chinese capital and debt markets are still highly regulated, which lessens support for small firms. Small firms cannot fulfill CSRC regulations for eligibility to access capital and debts markets and are also hurt the most because underlying weaknesses in the institutional environment make it difficult for them to access financing. Government ownership and political connection negatively affect competitive advantage. SOEs demonstrate that they have preferential access to equity and bonds capital. Competitive intensity affects competitive advantage negatively because increasing industry concentration leads to highly competitive access to different sources of financial capital in short-run. However, it does not affect sustained competitive advantage, because industry concentration is saturated in the long-run. Regional institutional development positively affects competitive and sustained competitive advantages because firms in highly developed regions have more favorable access to external sources of financial capital than firms in less-developed regions.
Limitations
This research has inherent limitations that suggest pathways for future research. Access to equity and bonds in China is hampered because of strict regulations in enterprise financing. Further research is needed to examine contextual robustness.
CONCLUSIONS
Access to internal and external financing offers distinct advantages in China's highly regulated, unequally developed market. Firms that can easily access external financing enjoy short-term competitive advantages and sustained competitive advantages over others that lack such abilities. Equity and internally generated capital confer competitive advantage, and equity, bank loans, and internally generated capital give sustained competitive advantage. In China's tightly regulated market with disparity in institutional development among regions, firms with access to sources of external financial capital have competitive advantages over firms that must rely on internally generated capital.
Strict regulations and institutional development disparities give some Chinese firms advantages in accessing needed capital. CSRC should regulate Chinese SEO and debt markets minimally with respect to access to equity, bonds, and especially eligibility regulations. However, CSRC must provide timely and accurate information, monitor activities, and punish firms that engage in fraudulent activities. These changes would reduce financial constraints, encourage investment in viable projects, reduce financing costs, encourage easy access to optimum capital structures, affect growth prospects, enhance competitiveness, and upgrade and secure long-term corporate sustainability.
Self-financing capability is also important for conveying competitive advantages, especially, they lack in access to sources of external financial capital. China's existing financial industry reforms benefit large privately owned firms and government-owned firms whatever the size. Institutional developments in regions are helpful for access to sources of external financial capital. In this context, policymakers should focus attention on further reforms to mobilize external financial resources for small and private firms and progress of institutional development in less-developed inland regions.
NOTES

1.
Security regulations in developed and free markets are divided into (a) discloser duties, (b) restrictions on fraud and manipulation, (c) restrictions on insider trading. Disclosure requirements reduce the cost of searching for information; restrictions on fraud and manipulation lower costs of verifying the credibility of information; and restrictions on insider trading protect investors from insiders recouping investments. The Chinese stock market functions differently from mature market economies because of administrator interventions (Bo, Huang, & Wang, 2011).
2.
We obtained equity, bond, bank loan data, and financial data from China Listed Firms' Seasonal Equity Offering Database, China Bond Market Research Database and Stock Market Financial Statements Database in CSMAR data series. We manually collected ownership data before 2003 and political connection data from annual company reports.
